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Between integration,
autonomization and radicalization.
Hamit Bozarslan on the Kurdish
Movement and the Turkish Left
Interview by Marlies Casier and Olivier Grojean
Hamit Bozarslan
EDITOR'S NOTE
Hamit Bozarslan is Director of Studies at the EHESS (Ecole des Hautes Etudes en
Sciences Sociales) in Paris. His most recent publications include Histoire de la Turquie de
l’Empire à nos jours (Paris, Tallandier, 2013), Sociologie politique du Moyen-Orient (Paris, La
Découverte, 2011) and Passions révolutionnaires. Amérique latine, Moyen-Orient, Inde (with
Gilles Bataillon & Christophe Jaffrelot, Paris, Éditions de l’EHESS, 2011). In this
interview, he develops an extensive historical account of the relations between the
Kurdish Movement1 and the Turkish Left from the 1950s, and - always favoring
comparisons with other movements - pointing to the crucial factors explored in his
previous work: the links between political generations and radicalization, the question
of self-sacrifice, the dynamics of integration-autonomization of the Kurdish Movement
in Turkey, and the various processes of ‘nationalization’-‘regionalization’ of the
Kurdish Question in the Middle East. This allows the identification of future research
questions, not only on the Kurdish Movement and the Turkish Left, but also on
individual political commitment and collective mobilization in Turkey, Kurdistan and
the Middle East.
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Introduction
1 If the contemporary Kurdish Movement in Turkey can be considered as a part of
the Left in the Turkish partisan system, this has not always been the case. And it
is of course part of the more global Kurdish Movement in the Middle East. So, we
would like you to elaborate on the relationship between the Kurdish movement
and the Turkish Left2… 
2 We need a  periodization for  that.  In  the 1950s the Kurdish movement is  not  at  all
included or integrated in the Turkish Left. One the one hand, the Turkish Left is still a
passive movement at that time, which exists only throughout a few universities.  So
when  you’d  look  at  the  Turkish  Communist  Party  in  1958-1959  you’ll  find  almost
nothing. On the other hand, I have the impression that after 1955-1956 there is a clearly
distinctive  Kurdish  sensibility  that  you  can  observe  in  Diyarbakir,  or  through  the
figures like Musa Anter, Tarik Ziya Ekinci and Canip Yıldırım. They are in contact with
Kamuran  Bedirxhan,  who  teaches  at  the  Institut  National  des  Langues  et  Civilisations
Orientales in Paris. They are aware of his articles and some of them dream about the
establishment of a Kurdish state, but they have almost no links with the Middle East
wide Kurdish movement. The emergence of the Barzani rebellion in Iraqi Kurdistan
creates a great hope for this circle of socialization. So the Kurdish movement doesn’t
start as a part of the Turkish Left. 
3 In the 1960s however the nascent Kurdish movement does integrate into the Turkish
Left. Why? There are probably many reasons. First of all, the 1960 coup changed a lot of
things in Turkey.  The leftwing ideas are widely discussed and the formation of  the
Turkish Workers’ Party – the Türkiye İşçi Partisi or TİP – begins. This creates a huge
public  avenue  and  possibilities  for  young  Kurdish  students.  And  from  that  point
onwards, the Kurdish movement becomes a part of a wider Turkish leftwing contest,
which recognizes the autonomy of the Kurdish Issue. So from 1961-1969/70 the Kurdish
movement can by and large be considered a part of or an extension of the Turkish Left,
or at least something that exists in a fusion with it.
4 Prior to that, the Turkish Communist Party was founded in the 1920s. This was
just after Lenin’s discourse on the nation and nationalism. Does it incorporate
some of these aspects in its program?
5 The Kurdish question is discussed within the Turkish Communist Party already in the
1920s  and  partly  after  the  proclamation  of  the  Republic.  When  we  look  at  the
publications  of  the  Turkish  Communist  Party  of  1925-1926  they  head  in  two
contradictory directions: on the one hand they recognize the Kurdish nation and admit
that  it  is  an oppressed nation.  At  the same time they support  the Kemalist  power,
because they consider that in spite of its repressive nature, it is ‘more progressive’ than
what they qualify as the Kurdish feudal lords.  The main nightmare for them is the
‘reactionary forces.’ But when you take the 1950s, the Communist Party finds itself in
East-Berlin and has a publication, but it has no foot on the ground in Turkey. In 1951
there are some arrests, but it is a very marginal event. 
6 In his Memories Musa Anter devotes one chapter to the ‘49’lar,’3 the 49 Kurdish
Intellectuals arrested in December 1959 and condemned for being ‘communists’
and agents of the Soviet Union. Could we consider ‘the 49’ socialists?
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7 The majority of the 49 define themselves as socialists, and you have 3 or 4 generations
joined together. Some of the people who are arrested in the case of the 49 were born in
1897. They are aged sixty or more. But the overwhelming majority was born in 1937, 38,
39. This means that they are very young people, who did not experience the Kemalist
period, because they were born at the extreme end of it4. These young people had leftist
ideas and dreams. While the others,  among them some older people (Sait  Elçi,  Ziya
Şerefhanoğlu, Faik Bucak, etc.), had a very strong, conservative rightwing sensibility.
There  is  thus  a  clear  division  between  these  generations,  and  between  these  two
worldviews: those who have a leftwing sensibility were accusing the others of being
prone to imperialism. Still, the ‘Kurdishness’ brought them together. For instance Örfi
Akkoyunlu, a leftwing Kurdist, was saying: ‘Let us first create a Kurdish fascist state and
in this Kurdish state I will say “Damn you fascism! Long live socialism!” and the Kurdish
judges will condemn me to death and when I will be hanged I will shout out “Long live
socialism!”’
 
I. Integration into the Turkish Left
8 So the first contacts between the Turkish Left and the Kurdish movement are
within the Turkish Workers’ Party?
9 Probably in the TİP; yet the TİP is not the only leftwing actor at this time. There is also
Yön,  which is  a leftwing Kemalist  journal,  published by some putschists,  like Doğan
Avcıoğlu, and with one of the most radical Kurdish activists, Sait Kırmızıtoprak writing
for it. So the frontiers are not clear-cut ones.
10 Inside the TİP, four Kurds are elected to the Parliament in 1965. How can we
understand the relationship between the Turks and the Kurds within the TİP?
Were they having good relationships or were the Turks considering the Kurds’
demands too radical?
11 It  is  very  difficult  to  answer  this  question.  The  relations  were  probably  very  good
because  some  important  figures  of  the  TİP  were  Kurds,  coming  from  the  Kurdish
movement and there was indeed a kind of reconfiguration after the 49 in the 1960s. The
Kurdish movement finds a sort of legitimization in the leftist discourses. Why? Because
the leftwing movement, and ‘Marxism-Leninism’ as a supposedly unified ideology insist
strongly on the rights of the oppressed nations to determine their own future. That
means  that  the  Kurdish  militants  believed  that  ‘Marxism-Leninism’  would
simultaneously  provide  them  a  way  to  remain  Kurdish  and  to  ensure  fraternity
between Kurds and Turks. It was thus supposed to allow a double emancipation: the
emancipation of the Turkish working class and oppressed strata, and the emancipation
of the Kurds. 
12 The French political scientist Jean Leca has argued that universal doctrines allow one to
remain ‘particular’ i.e., a specific ethnic or sectarian group, and at the same time to
have a universal understanding and projection of its fate5. I think that in the Kurdish
case we have a similar situation. So you remain Kurdish while at the same time you
accept, as a Kurd, the sacrifice that the fight for universal emancipation demands from
you. So the relations with the TİP are very strong. And in turn, the TİP adopts during its
4th Congress in 1970, a resolution recognizing the existence of the Kurds. But at the
same time, already at the end of the 1960s, and despite the relations being very close
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and even organic, there is the beginning of a split. This split can be explained by the
radicalization and autonomization of the Kurdish movement. 
13 At the time of the TİP’s resolution on the Kurds there were personalities like
Tarik  Ziya  Ekinci,  Mehdi  Zana,  Kemal  Burkay,  who  are  against  this  very
progressive resolution. They feared the reaction from the authorities. Did this
create tensions within the TİP?
14 The people you mention already found themselves in a rather marginal position by the
70s, especially when we compare the dynamics of the TİP in the Kurdish areas with the
dynamics  amongst  the  leftwing  Kurdish  students.  The  paradox  is  that  the  Kurdish
movement  remains  a  pacifist  movement  by  and  large  until  1973-1974.  With  the
exception of Sait Kırmızıtoprak. But what is considered as very radical step for a legal
party like the TİP in 1970, is already anachronistic for the Kurdish student movement,
which itself  is  still  a  legal  movement.  Compared to  the DDKO (Devrimci  Doğu Kultur
Ocakları,  Revolutionary  Eastern Cultural  Hearths )  or  to  the  leftwing  underground
revolutionary movements, the TİP is already considered as a pacifist movement with no
future. So after 1968 you have a bifurcation in the Turkish Left, both among the Kurds
and the Turks, but also among the Turkish militants themselves.
15 You talked about the double dimension in the discourses, being at the same time
universalistic  and  particularistic.  What  does  it  mean?  Did  Kurdish  militants
instrumentalize the Left to advance a pro-Kurdish agenda? Or were they as much
pro-Kurdish as Marxists? 
16 It  was  not  something  instrumental.  When  you  take  the  minority  movements
throughout the world,  if  we agree to call  them like this,  and you consider them as
sacrificial movements, then they cannot legitimize their own struggle exclusively by
their own cause. They have to relate their cause to something higher concerning the
humankind as a whole. That is why the emancipation of the humankind is extremely
important to them. So you interpret your own struggle and the price that you pay for it
as the price that you pay for the emancipation of the whole humankind, which, in turn,
will allow you to emancipate yourself, as Jean Leca has explained about the Algerian
mujahidin. What does this mean? It means that the fight against the colonial order will
allow you to overcome the dialectic of master and slave. You sacrifice your life not only
in order to free yourself, but also to free the colonizer himself from his dependence on
the need to  have  slaves.  For  the  Kurdish  movement,  the  Armenian movement,  the
Palestinian movement, you have this same pattern:  the price you pay, as an oppressed
group,  is  paid  as  much  for  the  humankind  broadly  speaking  as  for  your  own
emancipation. There is nothing instrumental in that. 
17 Obviously, when you as a sociologist try to objectify the situation, you see that there is
an ethnic, sectarian or regional stock within many leftwing movements throughout the
world. No movement can exist without a social basis, and a social basis is not always,
and not necessarily, a class-based one. There is a Kurdish stock, an Alevi stock, a Tamil
stock... But beyond this necessary objectification, one should also take into account the
sacrificial  subjectivity  of  the  engaged  actors,  which  has  a  real  transformative,
radicalizing effect on the leftwing contest broadly speaking.  The ‘cause’  is  not only
something  that  you objectively  believe  in:  you  deeply  experience  it.  Otherwise,  we
could not understand why the Palestinian movement had the trajectory it had. Or why
the  Armenian  movement  had  the  universalist  trajectory  it  had  until  the  1990s,  so
almost seventy years after the genocide.
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18 So  at  the  end  of  the  1960s,  there  is  a  real  ‘nationalization’ of  the  Kurdish
movement  in  Turkey  -  that  is  an  integration  to  the  Turkish  political  space  -
through the Turkish Left. Does this mean that it was less depending upon the ‘
regionalization’6 - at the scale of the Middle East - of the Kurdish issue, or are
there still a lot of interactions on that side as well?
19 In the 1960s, the Turkish Left is by and large ignoring the existence of the Kurdish
question in the Middle East. Of course, everyone knows that the Kurds are not only
living in Turkey but the political, interpretative framework that is developed is based
exclusively on a ‘national’  framework.  And don’t  forget that during this  period the
Turkish Left is looking at the Arab world. It is not Barzani who is a model for the Left.
Nasser is a model. Arafat is a model. Why? Because in 1967 the Turkish Left is not yet an
anti-Kemalist Left. For them Atatürk seems to be reincarnated, so to say, in the very
persons of Nasser and Arafat. Yet, for the Kurdish militants in the TİP, Barzani is a
genuine anticolonial Kurdish reference, a reference that rehabilitated the Kurds as an
oppressed nation throughout  the  Middle  East.  So  for  them the father  figure  is  not
Mustafa Kemal but Barzani. So these two references do coexist. 
20 Why are Nasser and Arafat such important models?
21 Because they are new and appear as being more radical than Atatürk in their ‘anti-
imperialist struggle.’ The Turkish leftists do not dissociate themselves from Kemalism,
but start to formulate some criticisms vis-à-vis Atatürk. In their emerging ‘Marxist-
Leninist’ conception of the world they believe that Atatürk led an anti-imperialist war
but consider his reforms not having gone far enough: they did not go beyond changing
the superstructure. He did not transform society in its depths. Nasserism and Arafatism
were considered as  socially  and politically  much more radical  and ‘anti-imperialist’
than  Kemalism.  So  Kemalism  is  considered  by  these  leftwing  figures  as  a  kind  of
aborted revolution,  but  still  a  revolution and still  a  reference.  While  for  the Kurds
Atatürk cannot be a reference.
II. Dynamics of radicalization and autonomization
22 Dev-Genç (Devrimci Gençlik, Revolutionary Youth) is created in 1969 and within it,
the  political  organizations  THKO  and  THKP-C  -  both  founded  in  1970  -  are
probably the most pro-Kurdish7. Are there other parties within the radical Left
that  were  pro-Kurdish?  And  how  did  these  radical  Turkish  parties  position
themselves vis-à-vis the Kurdish question from that period onwards?
23 Dev-Genç is an outcome of the radicalization process of the Turkish youth movement. It
is  a  radical  split-off  from the  TİP as  an  axiological-political  pattern.  So  one  of  the
reasons  why  the TİP is  considered  anachronistic  and  pacifist,  while  its  program is
becoming radical, is the formation of Dev-Genç. Many young people have no affinity at
all with the TİP. Dev-Genç is a symbol of a strongly radicalized Left; and within this
process of radicalization you have some kemalists,  like Doğan Avcioğlu,  who hold a
putchist perspective. And while they are different from Dev-Genç, you cannot really
draw a line between them and Dev-Genç. 
24 Both THKO and THKP-C emanate from Dev-Genç. Yet, they no longer believe in any
kind  of  legal  framework.  With  their  emergence,  Dev-Genç  itself  also  becomes  an
anachronism.  And  what  are  their  positions  vis-à-vis  the  Kurdish  question?  By
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1969-1970 no one can continue to ignore that there is a Kurdish question in Turkey. It is
true that these movements still pay a tribute to Kemalism, but that is a very limited
tribute; their axiological idols come from elsewhere (as ‘Che,’  ‘Uncle Ho,’  or Mao…).
 Their leaders,  Mahir Çayan and Deniz Gezmiş,  consider it  obvious that the Kurdish
nation is an oppressed nation. For both of them the socialist revolution will allow for
the transformation of Turkey and allow the Kurdish people to determine their own
future. That is why we count many Kurdish militants within these organizations. 
25 Mainly  Alevis  -  as  we  know  that  Dersim  has  a  long  ‘tradition’ of  armed
contestation - or also Sunnis? 
26 Alevis  and also Sunnis,  who find themselves mainly in İstanbul.  Both organizations
have very little presence in Kurdistan itself. They are based in İstanbul and Ankara,
amongst the students there. When you take these parties, you have three important
figures:  THKO  with  Deniz  Gezmiş,  who  is  very  romantic  and  anything  but  a
theoretician. He can be considered like Che Guevara or Fidel Castro. On the other hand
there is THKP-C with Mahir Çayan, someone with a theoretical thickness, who has read
about  the  Latin-American  experiences,  probably  also  read  Trotsky  and  advocates  a
theory of permanent revolution. For him, the revolution is not only a regime change,
but a process in time and space that aims at the creation of a resistant ‘New Man.’ You
have a third figure: İbrahim Kaypakkaya [who in 1972 founded the Communist Party of
Turkey-Marxist-Leninist (Türkiye Komünist Partisi-Marksist Leninist or TKP-ML), Editor’s
note]. He comes from the more plebeian, popular bases, unlike Mahir Çayan and Deniz
Gezmiş who come from the ‘petty bourgeoisie’ or the middle classes. He is Maoist, and a
Turkish Alevi, and he formulates the first real criticism of Kemalism as a fascist regime.
In his reading, one cannot find any positive feature in Kemalism since it was, from its
very beginnings, profoundly antirevolutionary and anti-Kurdish. Kaypakkaya develops
the most radical interpretation of the Kurdish issue in 1971-1972.
27 As we know the role it plays in PKK8 history, it is surprising to see that the idea of
the ‘New Man’ was there at such an early stage9…
28 When you read the poetry of Mahir Çayan, you will see a discourse of resistance beyond
political and military struggle; it really is Franz Fanon speaking10: the responsibility for
slavery lies also with the slave himself and it is only his resistance that will allow him to
become a free man. Violence is the main key to reach this goal. So it is not only about
changing the system but about creating a man who frees himself from his chains. We
haven’t got this in the writings of Deniz Gezmiş. But with Mahir Çayan, and later with
Abdullah Öcalan, this idea of the New Man is clearly formulated. 
29 Given that these three organizations are so pro-Kurdish, how could we explain
the formation of the DDKO? Is it because the Turkish legal Left is not receptive
enough  to  the  Kurdish  issue  that  many  old  TİP-members,  helped  by some
students, create the DDKO? Where should we situate the DDKO within this split
between the TİP and the student movements? 
30 The creation of DDKO has nothing to do with the three former organizations. With the
huge demonstrations of 1966-1967 in the Kurdish areas, the so-called Doğu Mitingleri
(‘Eastern Meetings’), you have something totally unprecedented in the Kurdish cities.
You have a kind of autonomization vis-à-vis the Turkish Left that comes from the basis
and wherein the Kurdish members of the TİP also play a very important role.  Take
Mehdi Zana: he is plebeian, he is a modest tailor,  who has no social capital and no
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cultural  capital,  yet  he  becomes  an  influential  figure  with  the  1966-67  plebeian
dynamics.  These  are  not  necessarily  leftwing  dynamics,  yet  the  Kurdish  youth  in
İstanbul and Ankara, but also the Kurdish urban society cannot remain outside of the
ascending leftwing movement. So the creation of the DDKO is a direct consequence of
both intra-Kurdish and Turkey-wide dynamics. But one should also add that at the turn
of 1971 (before the military coup), the landscape is fluid: people can be within the TİP,
participate to the Dev-Genç activities and at the same time have a foot in the DDKO.
You observe at once a process of autonomization of the Kurdish movement and fluidity
between it and the Turkish Left. 
31 The DDKO has two characteristics.  The first one is that the people in the DDKO are
profoundly pacifist, with the exception of Sait Kırmızıtoprak, who will create the first
radical cell within the Kurdish movement, advocating the armed struggle. The program
of the DDKO remains extremely reformist.  On the other hand, by the simple fact of
saying ‘We are from another part of Turkey, from the “East”’ – read ‘Kurdistan’ under
the  lines  –  ‘there  is  a  Kurdish  language,  there  is  a  Kurdish  history,’  they  create  a
momentum for  an  unprecedented  radicalization.  Of  course,  the  TİP recognized  the
existence of the Kurds in 1970, but in the case of the members of DDKO, they are not
supporters of the Kurdish cause: they are the Kurds, they are the cause. So, a profound
pacifism and profound symbolic radicalism go hand in hand.
32 The DDKO are the first, but the beginnings of the 70s see the creation of many
autonomous Kurdish parties. Rizgarî, the DDKD, Kemal Burkay’s party11… while
at the same time there is this radical Turkish Left that is radicalizing even more.
So how can we understand the autonomization at that time? 
33 This autonomization starts precisely with Sait Kırmızıtoprak, an important figure that
we have to take into account. He is one of ‘the 49’. He has been arrested. He is an Alevi
Kurd  from  Dersim.  By  1969-1970  he  creates  a  very  small  organization  called  the
Revolutionary Democratic Party of Kurdistan12. What is the theoretical contribution of
Sait Kırmızıtoprak? First of all he argues that Kurdistan is a colony. This is a dramatic
shift  in  scale  because  if  you  are  in  a  colony  your  fight  cannot  be  simply  an  anti-
imperialist fight - as the Turkish Left presents its own struggle - it has to be a war of
decolonization  fought  against  the Turkish  state  itself.  Kırmızıtoprak  has  been
extremely influenced by the Algerian and other anti-colonial wars. According to him, a
Kurdish war of liberation is necessary and possible within Turkey itself. This makes a
second very important evolution, because until Kırmızıtoprak no one envisioned any
kind of Kurdish armed struggle in Turkey itself, Barzani being extremely keen to have
pacific relations with this country. For Kırmızıtoprak, the war that should be fought
was definitely not a war similar to the precedent Kurdish uprisings like that of Sheikh
Said  in  1925;  it  had to  be  a  prolonged,  national  and social  anticolonial  war  like  in
Algeria and other countries. Kırmızıtoprak openly accuses the Turkish Left of being a
colonial Left and reproaches them not to stand for the colonized people. Kırmızıtoprak
gets killed in Iraqi Kurdistan already in 1971 in an internal Kurdish political vendetta.
But he leaves a very important legacy that will become a radicalizing legacy after 1973. 
34 From  1973  onwards  we  find  almost  exclusively  autonomous  Kurdish  organizations.
Obviously, some people still  remain in the TİP until  the 1980s, like Naci Kutlay and
Tarık  Ziya  Ekinci,  or  other  Turkey-wide  leftwing  organizations;  but  the  dominant
dynamics  after  1973-74  are  radicalized  intra-Kurdish  dynamics.  This  is  so  because
following  the  1971  military  coup  the  Kurdish  activists  believed  that  they  could  no
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longer  afford  a  reformist  policy.  From  1961  up  until  1971  people  believed  in  the
Constitution and it is incredible to see, a posteriori, how naïve they were. They believed
that  the  Constitution  was  the  supreme value  and that  it  protected  everyone.  They
continued to believe this even after the first political killings of 1968-69. But with the
military coup of 1971 they understood that the constitution is just a piece of paper.
That created a real shock. 
35 Secondly, after 1973, both in the Turkish Left and in the Kurdish Left you have a much
broader plebeian dynamic. There is a very important generational shift. You no longer
have only university students,  some of them coming from lower or wealthy middle
classes, participating to the political contest, but 15, 16, 17 years old youth. This is the
case  in  Turkey,  in  Kurdistan  and  probably  in  Iran  or  Latin  America  as  well… This
changes the very landscape of leftwing movements. This shift has probably to do with
the  spread  of  the  leftwing  ideas  that  are  re-appropriated  as  the  only  meaningful
political syntax by a precociously politicized youth. This political syntax allows you to
pass from adolescence to adulthood, create solid circles of socialization, and adopt a
specific axiology to legitimize it.  These children are either the children of the rural
exodus  that  started  20  years  earlier  or  the  second  generation  of  urbanized  young
people. Kurdistan is one of many worldwide scenes where this shift takes place13.
36 A third element is that following Barzani’s defeat in 1975 the Kurds no longer have any
kind of father. The figure of the father appears to be that of a ‘betrayer.’ Barzani is
accused of having ‘betrayed’ the Kurdish cause, not because he wanted to, but because
he trusted the ‘imperialist  powers.’  Finding themselves without this  reference after
almost 15 years of a Barzani cult creates a huge vacuum. This vacuum cannot be filled
without  a  process  of  radicalization.  Here  we  see  the  autonomous  groups  like  the
Kurdish Socialist Party emerge, and other organizations like the DDKD and Rizgarî, who
remain mostly pacifist but are very radical in their discourses and do not exclude the
possibility of an armed struggle. And then we have other groups like Kawa, Tekoşin
(‘Militancy’),  Beş  Parçacılar (‘Liberators  of  the five  parts  of  Kurdistan’).  There is  the
KUK14, which is an emanation of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, which is extremely
radical and committed to the armed struggle, and finally you have the emergence of
the PKK. And all of this happens in 4 years’ time, between ’73 and ’77-78. In less than
half  a  decade,  the  entire  Kurdish  political  landscape  undergoes  a  process  of
radicalization.
37 There is also a change in the parliamentary Left at this time. The Cumhuriyet Halk
Partisi (Republican People’s Party or CHP, founded by Mustafa Kemal) takes up
the pledge of social democracy again. This has consequences for the Kurds, in
particular  the  Alevi  Kurds,  who  are  quite  supportive of  the  CHP,  despite  the
party’s Kemalism. 
38 Indeed, despite the CHP’s Kemalism they are supportive of this party, but in order to
understand  this  fact,  we  have  to  go  back  in  time.  In  1971  the  military  coup  is  a
tremendous shock in many places of Turkey, but in particular in Kurdistan, and not
only among the Alevi Kurds but also among the Sunni ones. After the military regime,
the CHP appears as the only warrant of an ad minima democratization in Turkey. What
does this mean? That there will  be no return to the military regime and that basic
constitutional liberties will be respected. That is why many Kurds – Alevi or Sunni – do
support  the  CHP  at  that  time.  A  second  factor  is  that  in  1973-74  the  CHP  takes
effectively some steps towards democratization in the post-military era, and obtains
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the amnesty of the imprisoned militants and intellectuals, both Turks and Kurds. And
there is a third element that appears in 1974-1975, which is the beginning of a massive
phenomenon of violence, creating a total polarization within the society. Many people
consequently fear the perspective of a civil war. So you support the CHP not because
you  are  CHP  in  your  heart,  but  because  there  is  no  other  alternative.  Finally  the
sociological profile of the CHP between 1974-1980 is important: its Turkey-wide leaders
are leftwing nationalists and Kemalists. Locally however the CHP is widely Kurdified.
They are Kurds, speak Kurdish and are aware of their own Kurdishness. You have this
phenomenon in the rightwing movements too. The Islamist movement of Erbakan, for
example, is locally very strongly Kurdified. Even in the Justice Party of Demirel you
have Kurdish elements. So the fact that the CHP is both a nationalist Kemalist party,
but advocating democracy in Turkey and is locally Kurdified explains why this party is
at once criticized and at the same time widely present in Kurdistan. The breaking point
will be 1977 when Mehdi Zana and a couple of other people will be elected mayor in
Kurdistan.
39 So  you  are  saying  that  the  CHP  was  actually  not  a  leftist  party  but  a  pro-
democracy party?
40 Yes,  at  least  it  was giving the appearance to  be the only democratic  alternative in
Turkey of 1970s; it was indeed thought to be the only party able to protect the people
from civil war and against fascism, a kind of non-satisfactory harbor, but still a harbor.
Social-democrat  elements  of  the  CHP’s  discourse  maybe  allowed  it  to  have  some
popularity in 1973-1974, but not at all in 1975, and after 1976-77, a period during which
people only have one preoccupation: how to protect a rudimentary democratic system
and how to prevent a civil war, ending with the victory of the ‘fascists.’ The greatest
fear, both in Turkey and Kurdistan, is that of a civil war. And in 1977-78, there are huge
military ‘war-games’ in Kurdistan adding another layer to this fear. Without this fear it
would be impossible to understand the relatively powerful position the CHP found itself
in. 
41 Also in  the 1970s  you have to  take,  once again,  the phenomenon of  coexistence of
different generations into account. Within the Kurdish movement there are people who
are aged 45 and young people who are only 13-14 years old. The birth of the KUK and
the PKK creates a shock among the Kurds, as these groups fight a civil war amongst
themselves (probably some 400 lives have been lost in their internal fightings). As Musa
Anter explains in his memories, for the older generations this is an incredible trauma;
they consider the stability and the end of this internal violence as a necessity for the
survival of the Kurdish movement. The coexistence of classes, the plebeian dynamic
finds its translation in this youth, but also in the fact that someone like Mehdi Zana
becomes such a central figure. All of this is very important in order to understand the
configuration of the Kurdish movement in Turkey of the second half of 1970s.
 
III. New processes of integration: consequences of the
1980 coup and PKK’s insurgency
42 So  first  meetings  in  1974-1975,  creation  of  the  Kurdistan  Devrimciler
(Revolutionaries of Kurdistan) in 1976, and finally founding of the PKK in 1978.
On the one hand, we know that Abdullah Öcalan and some others were active in
the Turkish Left. On the other one, we know that the PKK from the start clashes
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with other radical leftist organizations. But following 1982 we see the creation of
several joint fronts, like BIR-KOM15… We were wondering why, at certain points,
PKK sought to align or collaborate with certain other radical leftist parties. What
incentives did these parties have to respond to PKK’s call?
43 You have to distinguish different periods. Until 1982 you are in a desperate situation
and all these kinds of coalitions are out of despair. The shock created by the military
coup of 1980 was huge. While you were expecting a civil war, you face a military coup
and within days you don’t have any kind of space for maneuver. So what to do? When
you take  the  situation  of  Chile,  or  Argentina,  or  Spain  you  have  exactly  the  same
configuration.  Everything you have  done in  the  past  has  stopped,  become to  some
extent meaningless, and you ask ‘what happened to us?’ and ‘how can we resist and
survive?’ The first concern is a concern with survival: ‘we should continue to exist’ as
an organization, as a political circle, as a political project. 
44 After  1982  I  think  the  situation is  a  little  bit  different.  The  PKK has  an  important
stronghold in Lebanon, important strategic networks in Syria, and can be considered as
the dominant actor among the leftwing exile organizations.  This dominant position
obliges the PKK to be internationalist, to assume a new role as the ‘big brother’ of the
Turkish Left, to protect the Turkish Left or what remains of it. For the radical Turkish
Left the consensus is reformulated in defense of the Kurdish movement. Indeed, these
fronts set-up did not lead anywhere, but you do see after 1982 that many former radical
Turkish leftist militants join the PKK or at least developed a pro-PKK policy. They could
say ‘here is something of us’. Don’t forget that the Turkish Left dreamt of the armed
struggle in the 1970s and all of a sudden you have an armed struggle but it is not a
Turkish armed struggle.  So it  symbolically changed the equilibrium of power.  What
İbrahim Kaypakkaya suggested for the Turkish case, they were realizing it. 
45 Let’s  return to ‘legal’  politics… Following the 1980 coup,  in 1985 we have the
establishment of the SHP16. This is the party wherein former members of the TİP
and other people will reinvest and will try to take part in legal politics. Could you
elaborate on this transition? How were the relations between Kurds and Turks
within the SHP? And what made the main difference between the SHP and the
former CHP?
46 Therein lies the key. Not one party, formerly illegal or legal, can rise up to its feet again
after 1983. Everything is destroyed. The cadres of the parties are gone. The military
regime from 1980 to 1983 was indeed very brutal; by threatening with the possibility of
a return to the ‘period of anarchism’ (i.e. violence) it succeeded in depoliticizing the
society as a whole, with many people retreating from the political sphere. This is the
case  for  all  the  parties.  If  you  look  at  the  radical  Right  party, the  MHP17,  there  is
nothing  left  of  them  in  1983.  Many  of  their  members  reconvert  to  Islamism,  or
withdraw into private, in some cases mafia business... So after the coup the political
space is totally unstructured. Former political leaders are not allowed to be elected and
no one is occupying the same place as he was before. 
47 The violence is gone and we are in a context of a very slow and painful exit out of the
military regime. Take the case of Chile in 1983, it is in this kind of situation that the
political actors found themselves. How to get out of the ‘reign of fascism’? So everybody
bends to the SHP - and before 1985 to the People’s Party, one of the three parties that
was allowed to exist by the military regime in 198318. This is the case of the former
unionists, that is to say, the ones who were not imprisoned. This is the case of former
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social-democrat political leaders, and of course, of the Kurds, that means the ones who
are not imprisoned. So gradually the SHP becomes the party where everyone who does
not belong to the rightwing parties reassembles. With the exception of course of the
radical Left and of the PKK…
48 When the PKK starts its war in 1984 there is no one that gives the guerilla more than
three months to survive. They are considered as adventurists, befall a lot of critique.
There is a fear of a massive return to repression.  Thus the SHP becomes a kind of
refuge in the face of the apocalypse of the past and a potential apocalypse in the future.
And it is true that after 1987 the atmosphere becomes more relaxed, but until 1987 we
find ourselves still in the context of the military regime. The National Security Council
is  still  highly  influential  under  President  Evren.  Economically,  the  new  Özal
government can do whatever it wants, but when it comes to politics or security, the
military is in charge, and this very much to the contentment of the very conservative
Prime  minister.  You  can  find  very  little  criticism in  the  press  towards  the  former
military regime. 
49 But from 1987 the PKK really inscribes itself permanently in the Kurdish, and Turkish
political arena. The public opinion can no longer ignore it. The Kurdish movement can
no longer ignore it. And at that time the Soviet-Union is in a state of fragmentation;
thus the preservation of a massively ‘anti-communist’ security regime becomes much
harder to legitimize. The Özal Government has already been present for 4 years and
thus has had the time for political appointments, for controlling the Interior Ministry...
So there is a period of change from 1987 onwards. For instance, the former leaders of
the  Communist  Party  are  invited  to  return  to  Turkey:  communism  is  no  longer
considered a threat. And during the same period one can observe a bifurcation between
the Kurdish movement and the SHP too. 
50 So there is no advancement of pro-Kurdish ideas within the SHP before 1987?
How does this divergence between Kurdish and Turkish personalities within the
SHP come into being?
51 Everybody knows who are the Kurdists, but there is no advancement of pro-Kurdish
ideas at all within the SHP. The Turkey-wide democratization is the only claim, still
carefully  formulated  by  the  SHP.  No  leading  figures,  Kurdish  or  Turkish,  dare  to
pronounce a critique of the military regime. But from 1987, with the weakening of the
military  regime  you  have  a  very  rapid  radicalization.  As  I said,  the  military’s
mechanisms of control start to lose their strength. So the program of democratization,
the critique of the military regime and the Kurdish question are again discussed within
different frameworks. Without a doubt, the word ‘Kurd’ is not yet used in 1987, but it is
certainly, and even massively used in 1989. No one is yet defending the PKK in 1987 but
in the following years the politicians can no longer ignore what is happening and they
have to admit that the PKK enjoys popular support. The year 1989 is also crucial for
another reason.  Some Kurdish SHP-deputies  accept to attend the conference at  the
Kurdish Institute in Paris and even though there is only one of them who addresses the
people at the conference, there is a qualitative shift. 
52 So this conference about the Kurdish Question takes place in Paris in 1989. The
participants are being excluded from the SHP, others withdraw. Is this something
that they had to undergo or was it also experienced as an opportunity?
53 The people who participated in the Paris’ Kurdish Conference are still very far away
from the PKK’s position whereas at the same time they are known to belong to the
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Kurdish  movement.  The  fact  that  they  have  been  excluded  from  their  party  is
instrumentally very important. For them it means that they cannot integrate into the
Turkish  political  class  and  that  they  have no  other  choice  as  Kurds  to  become
autonomous from the Turkish political class. Locally they can use this event explaining
that they have been excluded because the Turkish political class, including the legal
‘leftwing’ party, is not able to listen to their cause or accept their claims. This creates
the conditions for a new and popular radicalization,  which will  lead to the current
situation. At one point they say ‘we have nothing to do with a Turkish party even if it
labeled itself as “social-democratic,” and our Kurdishness is the main ground on which
our political  identity and struggle are based’.  Also of  importance is  1991,  when the
Turkish Islamist party Refah allies itself with the radical political Right. In a matter of
days  all  the  Kurdish  Islamists  resign  from  Refah.  This  way  this  party  loses  its
strongholds in Kurdistan and loses support amongst the Kurdish population.
 
IV. Reconfiguration of a distinct Kurdish political
space since the 1990s
54 You said that the Kurdist people within the SHP find themselves in positions very far
from the PKK… Yet in 1990 they establish the HEP19, a party that is not entirely founded
on pro-PKK bases, but which nevertheless develops a stronger linkage with the PKK and
the guerilla. How should we understand the position of the HEP and its successors as
compared to the SHP? 
55 My reading is that in the 1990s you have a total reconfiguration of the Kurdish political
space,  as  a  distinct  space  from  the  Turkish  political  space.  What  makes  this
reconfiguration possible is  that the PKK, which was so heavily criticized within the
Kurdish  movement  and  by  the  Kurdish  elites,  turned  progressively  into  a  totally
accepted and legitimate actor. It even imposed itself as the primary reference point of
the Kurdish contestation.  From the 1990s onwards it  is  what this actor says that is
determinant. You cannot do anything if it contradicts with the lines set out by this
actor. The other Kurdish actor, that we can define as the representative actor of the
Kurdish political space, is of course the HEP (and its successive avatars). This second
organization,  which  is  implemented  on  the  ground  and  acting  legally,  cannot  be
entirely distinguished from the PKK, but cannot be reduced to it either. The party has
to be accountable in everyday life,  is  very pluralistic  and,  naturally,  cannot have a
military  hierarchy.  And these  two parties,  the  HEP and its  successors  and PKK,  do
restructure the Kurdish space. One as a representative actor, the other as the reference
actor.
56 Should we consider the HEP a leftist party like any other leftist party, with its
labor unionists and its defence of social justice as any other leftist party?
57 The HEP is above all a Kurdish party, plus a leftwing party. I think that says a lot. What
is this ‘plus’? It means the party is saying ‘we are in the front of any kind of social
fights,  the  trade  unions  fights,  the  fight  for  women’s  rights…  we  are  the  most
democratic party of Turkey’ but at the heart there is this Kurdish thickness. That is also
the case for DEP20. It will be the case for all the parties. What makes the HEP a popular
party is that before everything else it is a Kurdish party.
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58 And does the relationship with the PKK means that the HEP will also take up a
more Marxist  position?  Or  is  there  no incentive  to  affiliate  with  this  Marxist
ideology, in particular as Marxist concepts are already starting to change within
the PKK itself by that time?
59 I think that in the 1990s the PKK remains a radical leftwing movement. Its discourse
does not change radically, in spite of the fall of the Berlin Wall. Why? Because to some
extent the PKK is a ‘Fanonian’ party rather than a ‘Marxist-Leninist’ party, the way this
concept  was  understood  in  the  1970s  and  1980s.  PKK’s  Fanonian  terms  of  self-
identification, or its call for self-sacrificial forms of violence remain alive even in the
1990s. The HEP does not adopt these ideas. Partly because it is not in the tradition of its
members. Some of them are coming from the TİP, some of them from the CHP or from
the trade-unions, and they will not adopt such a radical discourse. But they will adopt a
very radical discourse concerning the democratization of Turkey, human rights, the
trade union rights and many other things. From this point of view, they can be defined
as radicals, but without this Fanonian, sacrificial dimension21.
60 The relations between this reference actor, which is the PKK, and the representative
actor, which is HEP (and its successors) have not been easy and they still aren’t. They
couldn’t  divorce and,  still,  my guess  is  that  this  couple has  never been an entirely
happy couple. They were and still are obliged to co-exist. They were obliged to give
meaning  to  one  another.  And  at  the  same  time  they  had  and  still  have  different
ambitions. The PKK’s ambition is to remain the reference actor, which at one point uses
violence and determines the outer borders of the political space, sets the red lines. It
defines what is legitimate and illegitimate, from its own point of view, but presented as
the point of view of the Kurdishness as such. The Kurdish legal party on the other hand
has an interest in broadening itself, opening itself to other parties, having a place and
visibility  in  Turkey  itself  and  negotiate  with  Turkey,  negotiate  with  the  women’s
movement,  with  the  trade  unions,  to  have  another  kind  of  relationships  with  the
Americans  or  with  the  Europeans… For  example,  the  PKK is  considered  a  terrorist
organization by the United States and the European Union and at the same time the
Kurdish legal representatives are welcomed in Washington. So this creates new kinds of
resources. The PKK cannot ignore that fact and cannot condemn it. But at the same
time this creates a complex situation. 
61 You mentioned that, in the 1990s the Marxist discourse of the PKK does not really
change, despite the development of their theory on the ‘New Man.’ But some of
the people who had joined the PKK or the Turkish Left in the beginning of the
1980s no longer consider it a leftist movement, but just an ‘Apoist’ movement,
after Öcalan’s nickname…
62 In the 1990s many Turkish leftist movements criticized the PKK, but not because they
were  against  its  armed  struggle.  They  would  even  support  the  independence  of
Kurdistan,  but  for  them  the  PKK  is  no  longer  a  leftwing  movement,  ideologically
speaking.  The  personality  cult  of  Öcalan,  internal  killings  and  PKK’s  regional
positioning, are not necessarily accepted by the Turkish Left. But one should also take
into account the absence of any kind of actor with the ability to produce the leftwing
norms internationally speaking. The less there are international norms determining
what a leftwing movement is or should be, the more there is a switch from the leftwing
revolutionary axiology and discourses to the program of democratization. To give just
one  example:  before  the  1990s  no  one  would  speak  about  the  women  rights  as
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something that should be defended per se, or the rights of homosexuals. In the 1970s,
the  leftwing  movements  would  even  consider  homosexuality  as  something  totally
perverse, while in the 1990s you cannot be from a leftwing sensibility if you don’t take
into account the rights of the homosexuals. The reason of this switch is that, in the
absence of ‘heavy actors’ like the Soviet Union or Maoist China, the leftwing movement
is no longer able to produce its own norms, and has to accept the democratic norms
coming from outside and those norms are much more individually based than before.
To some extent, you see this evolution also within the strict framework of the PKK
itself: in the 1980s no one could accept the idea that there are Kurdish rock bands and
rap bands, whereas today PKK cannot object to this. It has been obliged to accept this. 
63 And to invite them for Newroz (the Kurdish springsfest)… 
64 To  invite  them  and  to  accept  these  norms  that  are  coming  from  the  outside  as
democratic and universal  ones.  The Kurdish movement in Turkey, and the pro-PKK
parties in Syria and Iran, define themselves today as ecologist and feminist ones. You
could not imagine such a political program in the past. And these are armed struggle
actors.  They are armed but still  need to cultivate an emancipatory horizon, besides
their Kurdishness, that they can present to the Kurdish society and to the world at
large. This is also true for the Kurdish legal party in Turkey, which takes up the defense
of the rights of homosexuals. I think they would be very unhappy if there were Kurdish
homosexuals  defending overtly  their  homosexuality,  but  at  the same time they are
obliged to say that ‘We cannot be democratic unless we defend this cause’. 
65 But to return back to your question on the relations between the PKK and the Turkish
radical Left: today, the Turkish radical Left no longer has any vitality. In the 1990s and
even more so in the 2000s we can no longer talk about a radical Turkish Left. Of course
we have some militarized groups in the region of Dersim, and the relationship between
TIKKO22 and PKK have been very bad in this specific region. In the Maraş region as well
as in the Black Sea Region, some sleeping guerilla cells still seem to exist. But there is
no longer a radical Turkish leftist mass movement. The Turkish Left we can observe
today  is  more  a  liberal  Left,  engaged  nationally  in  defense  of  individual  rights,
ecological questions, feminism, the defense of animal rights… And it is true that this
alevism that nurtured the radical Left has also been dismantled and become inward
looking. 
66 Today, in parallel, the young militants are often very heavily socialized in the
ideas of PKK. Sometimes more than the older generations...
67 Of course, therefore my hypothesis is that the older generation of PKK tries everything
to control the radicalization of these young people, which has become possible by the
very  popularization  of  the  PKK itself.  The  price  of  this  control  is  to  be  itself  very
radical. If the older PKK generation does not accept a kind of radicalism, they will not
be able to prevent the radicalization and autonomization of the younger generations.
You could see this phenomenon in many places, as in the case of the Islamist movement
of  the  1990s.  The  Islamist  movement  had  the  obligation  to  be  radical  in  order  to
prevent the radicalization of the younger generation. 
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V. Nationalization, regionalization, and transnational
networks
68 To go back to larger processes, in the 1960s we have this ‘nationalization’ of the
Kurdish movement that finds itself at the side of the Turkish Left and we witness
something similar following the coup, given that the questions they deal with are
particular to Turkey. But we have a ‘regionalization’ in the 1970s - with the fall of
Barzani - and at the end of the 80s – with Halabja and then the war against Iraq -
which will all contribute to the felt need to develop parties of their own… The
PKK in 1978 and the HEP in 1990. So could we say that the autonomization in
relation  to  the  Turkish  Left  often  comes  at  a  time  of  ‘regionalization’  of  the
Kurdish issue?
69 Yes, but on the condition not to forget the internal dynamics, despite everything. As I
said, the process of autonomization started in 1969-1970 with the DDKO… In 1975 this
autonomization  went  hand  in  hand  with  the  radicalization.  There  was  an  extreme
axiological  urgency felt  in Kurdistan in the wake of the fall  of  Barzani that pushed
many people to act, to do ‘something’…  in order to ensure the survival of Kurdishness
both in Turkey and elsewhere in the Middle East.  The ‘1975’  momentum cannot be
explained solely by the possibility to establish Kurdish parties, but by this absolute and
sacrificial sense of urgency. Both the KUK and the PKK are the outcomes of this sense of
urgency. 
70 To  a  large  extent,  the  Kurdish  space  can  be  considered  Middle-East-wide  as  an
integrated and interacting political space. Since 1958, whenever there is an important
event in one part of Kurdistan, it has an immediate impact upon the other parts too.
This is also clear in the memoirs of the ‘49’. For them, Barzani is clearly the counter-
Atatürk. He is the Atatürk of the Kurds and what is more, he is alive. So the beginning
of the Barzani revolt in 1961 and its fall in 1975, the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the
establishement  of  a  ‘safe  haven’  in  Iraqi  Kurdistan  in  1991… all  these  events  have
region-wide  structuring  effects  on  the  Kurdish  space  in  the  broad  sense.  The  PKK
guerilla in 1984, also has such a structuring effect, even the arrest of Öcalan in 1999
exerted a radicalizing impact upon the Kurds of Iran… so indeed, different parts of
Kurdistan are symbolically, and more and more, concretely, interacting.
71 So at certain times issues will be more structured at a regional level, the PKK and
more generally the Turkish part of the Kurdish movement being more receptive
to what is happening in Iran, Iraq and Syria. Does this, at these times, transgress
the borders of Kurdistan in the sense that relationships are also developed with
for example the Communist Party of Iraq, the Syrian Left...? Or are the contacts
limited to contacts with the Turkish Left and the international Left? How do the
contacts with the ‘external’ Left look like?
72 To my knowledge there have never been contacts between the Kurds of Turkey and the
Arab Left or Syrian, Iraqi or Iranian Left. However, there were extremely close contacts
with Palestinians. In the 1980s the Kurdish movement and the Palestinian movement
evolve together for a certain period of time. The PKK participates into the Lebanon war
for example, in 1982, and fights against Israel. And at the end of the 1970s and in the
beginning of the 1980s these two movements feed one another. But after 1986-1988 this
relationship ceases to exist. 
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73 With the Socialist International there are relations since the second half of the 1980s
and  not  only  by  the  Kurds  of  Turkey,  but  also  the  Iranian  Kurds.  For  example
Ghassemlou knew everybody, including François Mitterrand, and was a member of the
French Socialist Party. Talabani has been president of the Socialist International. And
Kurds  from  Turkey  tried  to  develop  relationships  with  Ségolène  Royal,  François
Hollande in France, Oscar Lafontaine in Germany… These were fruitful relationships
but these were institutional relationships and did not relate to the radicalization. 
74 Lastly, the relations with Sinn Fein, the Catalans, are relations of the 2000s, not before.
The relations with the ANC23 of South-Africa for example date back to 2004, but these
are  also  related  with  Turkish  journalists  and  intellectuals’  relationships  with  these
parties, like Hasan Cemal, Cengiz Candar… They get in touch with these parties in order
to  look  into  how  they  have  resolved  their  questions,  how  they  developed  peace
negotiations…
 
Conclusion: Radicalism, conservatism and political
generations
75 Maybe  to  finish  some  questions  about  the  political  Right.  Given  the  1982
constitution the Kurds and Turkish Left  find themselves in similar situations.
There is  not  the same space for  conservative Kurdish parties  to  develop.  The
situation in Turkey differs from the one in Iraq.  So is  it  really this historical
context that explains the specificity of this relationship? 
76 I  would add two nuances.  In the 1970s the Kurdish political space in Iraq is almost
entirely on the Left, a fact that contrasts with the fundamentally conservative positions
of Barzani as a ‘national leader.’ So Barzani, the conservative, is directing a movement
that is a ‘revolutionary’ movement. If you look at Talabani’s discourse in the 1970s and
1980s  he  is  advocating  a  kind  of  Maoism.  And  the  number  2  of  the  PDK,  Sami
Abdulrahman has leftwing positions. But both parties were very radical at that time
and there is a relation between the dissidence and the radicalization. But you are right,
today  you  cannot  imagine  a  radical  leftist  movement  in  Iraqi  Kurdistan.  Even  the
communist  Kurdish  movement  in  Iraq  is  extremely  conservative  and  cooperates
electorally with the Islamists. 
77 Secondly there has always been, and still is, a conservative force amongst the Kurds in
Turkey. While there was hegemony of the Left over the Kurdish movement, there has
always  been an internal  ‘rightwing’  tradition too.  But  this  tendency has  not  had a
chance  to  become  autonomous.  People  like  Şerafettin  Elçi,  Abdülmelik  Fırat  –  the
grandson of Sheikh Said - were or are still conservative. So there has always been an
opposition, but an integrated opposition. And while being conservative, the figures of
this tradition did not try to impose conservative policies upon the Kurdish movement.
They had their own legitimacy, a constituency, and a very strong symbolic prestige. But
they could never grow autonomous. Is it because this movement was first of all leftist?
Or mainly national? Well, I would say that the reason of this non-autonomization is
because the Kurdish movement in Turkey is first of all profoundly national. So any kind
of open dissidence would be considered as a dissidence towards the nation, and thus as
treason. So until today, these conservative personalities have interest to stay within the
movement, even if it is by and large a ‘leftist’ one. 
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78 We also need to take into consideration that in Turkey you have only two politically
radical generations called the ‘68ers’ and ‘78ers,’ i.e., people who are born in 1948 or
1958, and become active 20 years after and are the great actors of the 1968-1971 and
1977-1980 events. But if you take the case of Kurdistan you also have the generations of
1988ers, 1998ers and without a doubt a generation of 2008ers; these people experienced
Kurdish mobilizations, got access to Kurdish cultural resources, etc., and have entered
adulthood under the conditions of PKK’s guerilla war. Every generation found itself
caught  up  in  maelstrom  of  radicalization.  And  every  generation  had  to  become  a
politically active one, which led to an important rejuvenation of the Kurdish movement
broadly speaking. The Kurdish movement today is consequently very young. If you look
at the studies by Ayşen Uysal and Oğuz Topak with regard to CHP members24, you will
see that many local cadres are 50-55 years old, whereas in today’s Kurdish movement
many cadres are 25-30 years old.  The BDP25 stands in sharp contrast with the CHP,
where Ankara still controls the nominations, and which currently is trying to integrate
the  generation  of  1958!  This  rejuvenation  of  Kurdish  political  space  also  inhibits
conservatism. 
79 Of course, if tomorrow we had peace, people who are 30 today would have enough time
to age and become conservative!  But,  for  the time being,  having a  phenomenon of
rejuvenation every ten years has proven to be politically very meaningful.
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ANC: African National Congress
BDP: Barış Demokrasi Parti, Peace and Democracy Party
Bir-Kom: see FKBDC
CHP: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, Republican People’s Party
DDKD: Devrimci Demokratik Kültür Dernekleri, Revolutionary Democratic Cultural
Associations
DDKO: Devrimci Doğu Kultur Ocakları, Revolutionary Eastern Cultural Hearths
DEP: Democrasi Partisi, Democracy Party
DSP:Demokratik Sol Parti, Democratic Left Party
Dev-Genç: Devrimci Gençlik, Revolutionary Youth
EHESS: Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales
FKBDC: Faşizme Karşı Birleşik Direniş Cephesi, Unified Resistance Front Against Fascism
HEP: Halkın Emek Partisi, People’s Labor Party
HP: Halkçı Parti, People's Party
INALCO: Institut National des Langues et Civilisations Orientales
KUK: Kurdistan Ulusal Kurtuluşçuları, Kurdistan National Liberationists
MHP: Milliyetçi Harekât Partisi, Nationalist Action Party
PDKT: Partîya Demoqrata Kurdistana Tirkîye, Democratic Party of Turkish Kurdistan
PKK: Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, Kurdistan Worker’s Party
PSK: see TKSP
SHP: Sosyaldemokrat Halk Partisi, People’s social democrat Party
SODEP: Sosyal Demokrasi Partisi, Social Democracy Party
THKO: Türk Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu, People’s Liberation Army of Turkey
THKP-C: Türk Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi, Turkish People Liberation’s Party-Front
TİP: Türkiye İşçi Partisi, Turkish Workers’ Party
TİKKO: Türkiye İsçi Köylü Kurtuluş Ordusu, Workers' and Peasants' Liberation Army
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TKP-ML: Türkiye Komünist Partisi-Marksist Leninist, Communist Party of Turkey-Marxist-
Leninist
TKSP: Türkiye Kürdistan Sosyalist Partisi, Socialist Party of Turkish Kurdistan. Later
renamed in PSK: Partîya Sosyalîsta Kurdistan, Socialist Party of Kurdistan
NOTES
1.  In Turkey, the Kurdish Movement includes Islamist groups and tendencies (like the armed
group Hizbullah in the 1990’s) but these are quite marginal. If we do not refer to the Islamist part
of the Kurdish Movement in this interview, conservative personalities are of course taken into
account. 
2.  In Turkish, see also Bozarslan 2007.
3.  See Anter 1990: 151-182 and also Kutlay 1994.
4.  See Bozarslan 2013.
5.  See Leca 1991. 
6.  On the ‘regionalization’ of the Kurdish Question, see Bozarslan 1997: 292-311.
7.  THKO:  Türk  Halk  Kurtuluş  Ordusu,  People’s  Liberation  Army of  Turkey;  THKP-C:  Türk  Halk
Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi, Turkish People Liberation’s Party-Front.
8.  Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan,  Kurdistan Worker’s Party, founded in 1978 and led by Abdullah
Öcalan.
9.  See Grojean 2008.
10.  See Fanon 2004. 
11.  Kemal Burkay’s party is the TKSP (Türkiye Kürdistan Sosyalist Partisi, Socialist Party of Turkish
Kurdistan),  that  will  later  be  renamed  PSK  (Partîya  Sosyalîsta  Kurdistan,  Socialist  Party  of
Kurdistan);  DDKD:  Devrimci  Demokratik  Kültür  Dernekleri,  Revolutionary  Democratic  Cultural
Associations.
12.  The PDKT (Partîya Demoqrata Kurdistana Tirkîye, Democratic Party of Turkish Kurdistan) has a
clear revolutionary line, while its predecessor, led by Faik Bucak, is far more conservative.
13.  See Bozarslan 1999 and Mardin 1978.
14.  Kurdistan Ulusal Kurtuluşçuları, Kurdistan National Liberationists, founded officially in 1978.
15.  In fact the FKBDC: Faşizme Karşı Birleşik Direniş Cephesi, Unified Resistance Front Against Fascism,
founded in 1982.
16. Sosyaldemokrat Halk Partisi, People’s Social Democrat Party.
17.  Milliyetçi Harekât Partisi, Nationalist Action Party.
18.  The SHP resulted from the fusion, in 1985, of the Social Democracy Party (Sosyal Demokrasi
Partisi, SODEP) of Erdal İnönü and the People's Party (Halkçı Parti) of Aydın Güven Gürkan, both
founded  in  1983.  The  other  leftwing  party  of  this  period  is  the  DSP  (Demokratik  Sol  Parti,
Democratic Left Party) founded in 1985 by Ecevit’s family. 
19.  Halkın Emek Partisi, People’s Labor Party, pro-Kurdish.
20.  Demokrasi Partisi, Democracy Party, which follows the ban of the HEP in 1993.
21.  See Bozarslan 2004.
22.  Türkiye İsçi Köylü Kurtuluş Ordusu, Workers' and Peasants' Liberation Army. Armed Branch of
many groups originating from the TKP-ML.
23.  ANC: African National Congress.
24.  See Uysal ; Topak 2010. 
25.  Barış Demokrasi Parti, Peace and Democracy Party, successor of the HEP, DEP and of the other
following pro-Kurdish parties.
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